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MICRO-FOUNDATIONS FOR STRATEGY:  
A GOAL-FRAMING PERSPECTIVE ON THE DRIVERS OF VALUE CREATION 
 
 
  
Abstract   
Scholars increasingly seek to proffer microfoundations for macro management theory, 
notably strategic management theory. These microfoundations naturally revolve around 
human resources. We argue that proper microfoundations for strategic management 
theory must recognize that the management of motivation is first and foremost a matter 
of the management of cognitions of organizational members, an insight that we found in 
goal-framing theory, an emerging perspective based on cognitive science, behavioral 
economics, and social psychology. Building on this insight, we argue that a key reason 
why strategic goals matter to firm performance──that is, firm-level value creation and 
value capture and sustained competitive heterogeneity──is that such goals influence 
value creation rooted in employee motivations. Unfolding this idea allows us to 
generate new insight in the relations between value creation, strategic leadership and 
strategic goals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategic management is concerned with the creation, identification, and exploitation of those 
sources of competitive heterogeneity that result in high levels of appropriable value creation. Yet, 
many of the causal linkages between the strategic management process and value creation are 
unclear. In particular, how do strategic goals affect value creation? One hypothesis is that such goals 
mainly steer the cognition and actions of the top management team. Another one is strategic goals 
affect very functioning of the firm in the sense that they influence its internal governance and the 
cognition and motivation of organizational members, not just the top management In this article we 
make the case that strategic goals matter in this broader sense. Understanding how this works 
requires attention to microfoundations—specifically, to microfoundations that highlight the 
(intertwined) motivation and cognitions of individuals (rather than, say, routines; but see Winter, 
2013).  
 It is increasingly recognized that the microfoundations of strategic management greatly 
matters to the questions that scholars in the field can raise, address, and answer (Abell, Felin & Foss, 
2008; Van de Ven, 2013). Much of the concern with microfoundations fundamentally revolves 
around human resources, often argued to be the “key ingredient to organizational success and 
failure” (Baron & Kreps, 1999: 4). Accordingly, research highlights the cognitions (Gavetti, 2005) 
and, more often, motivations of those human resources (Coff, 1999; Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007).  
Along with a number of the other contributors to this symposium (in particular, Felin & 
Barney, 2013), we argue that strategic management theory is in need of better microfoundations. We 
take it as a given that such microfoundations must involve individuals. While indeed individuals 
have been highlighted in recent microfoundational research in macro management theory, mainly 
strategic management, we are concerned that extant research is dichotomized. Specifically, such 
research either starts from purely cognitive foundations (Gavetti, 2005; Teece, 2007; Powell, Lovallo 
& Fox, 2011: 1370) or from purely motivational foundations (e.g., Abell, Felin, & Foss, 2008; 
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Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Wang & Barney, 2008; Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). However, a crucial 
insight that has emerged from cognitive (social) psychology over the last twenty years is that 
cognitive and motivational processes are so strongly intertwined that they must be considered 
simultaneously and as closely interacting (Kruglanski et al., 2002). We argue that proper 
microfoundations for strategic management theory should recognize the fundamentally intertwined 
nature of cognition and motivation: the management of motivation is first and foremost a matter of 
the management of overarching goals that link cognition and motivation. Building on this insight, we 
argue that a key reason why strategic goals matter to firm performance──that is, firm-level value 
creation and value capture and sustained competitive heterogeneity──is that such goals influence the 
overarching goals of members of the organization and thereby the value creation rooted in employee 
motivations (an idea already hinted at in Barney & Griffin, 1992; Hamel & Prahalad, 1989; Kay, 
2010; Birkinshaw, 2012.) The purpose of this article is to work out the logic of this link.  
We specifically show that goal-framing theory (Lindenberg, 2003, 2004, 2006; 2008, 
Lindenberg & Foss, 2011)—an emerging perspective based on cognitive science, behavioral 
economics, and social psychology (e.g., Förster, Liberman & Higgins, 2005; Gollwitzer & Bargh, 
1996; Kruglanski & Köpetz, 2009)—has the unique capacity to address this link (Foss, 2011). We 
show that the microfoundations provided by goal-framing theory allow us to address and answer key 
strategy questions in a novel manner, and in particular how strategic goals influence firm 
performance. Goal-framing theory deals with overarching goals that influence large clusters of 
subgoals. Specifically, the theory states that the overarching goal most conducive to value creation is 
one that promotes a motivation for joint production, whereby organizational members are motivated 
to engage in joint productive endeavors in which they choose their actions in terms of joint goals and 
exert intelligent effort to reach joint goals (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011). However, such a normative 
goal-frame can easily be sidelined by other overarching goals that are explicitly or implicitly 
expressed in the strategic management process of the firm. The crucial mechanism is that 
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overarching goals of employees are subject to a top-down contagion process by overarching goals 
from top management. 
The motivation that is most conducive to value creation is not mobilized by overarching goals 
that make blatant reference to the maximization of profits or shareholder value, exactly—we will 
argue—because such strategic goals prompt employees to adopt goal-frames that are not conducive 
to joint production motivation. Rather, profit, shareholder value and market share must not be 
pursued as the major explicit strategic goal but obliquely as a result of more socially oriented goals 
(cf. Kay, 2010; Birkinshaw, 2012). 
 In sum, in building our argument about the impact of the strategic management process on the 
contribution of human resources to value creation, we draw on recent developments in cognitive 
science, social psychology, and behavioral economics which “provide new opportunities for merging 
psychology and strategy” (Powell et al., 2011: 1370), going beyond the dichotomization between the 
cognitive and the motivational dimensions in extant microfoundational research. We develop novel 
implications for key strategy issues from goal-framing theory. Our theory relates to established 
insights in particularly the resource-based view (Barney, 1986, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1996; Foss, 
2011), but uniquely points to the importance of the role of overarching goals in establishing joint 
production motivation as the instrument for creating maximum value. Relatedly, we briefly discuss 
the huge difficulties of sustaining joint production motivation over time, which is based on the 
precariousness of the normative goal frame and its tendency to give way to competitive goal-frames, 
as a key reason for the decline of competitive advantages.  
PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: 
GOAL-FRAMING THEORY 
Beyond Behavioral Micro-foundations  
Research has increasingly emphasized that sound microfoundations are important to the 
development of strategic management theory. Traditionally, the microfoundations of strategic 
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management theory have been located in economics (i.e., industrial organization, organizational 
economics, and financial economics; e.g., Coff, 1997, 1999; Lippman & Rumelt, 2003; Abell, Felin 
& Foss, 2008;  Wang & Barney, 2008; Chatain & Zemsky, 2011), but there are familiar limits to the 
explanatory leverage of standard economics. Thus, scholars increasingly look for microfoundations 
for strategy in psychology. For example, how the heuristics of strategic decision-making emerge 
from experience (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011), or how firm-level identification processes influence 
competitive dynamics (Livengood & Reger, 2010), are difficult to analyze on a deep level solely 
from an economics perspective (which is not to say that such insights necessarily escape economic 
modeling, e.g., Camerer & Lovallo, 1999).  
Thus, strategic management scholars have long made use of psychology research (Hodgkinson 
& Sparrow, 2002), most notably behavioral decision theory as embodied in Cyert and March (1963) 
and reflected in the emergence of the “behavioral strategy” field (Bromiley, 2005; Gavetti, Levinthal 
& Ocasio, 2007; Powell et al., 2011), as well as in cognitive perspectives (e.g., Porac & Thomas, 
1990; Weick, 1995) and notions such as attention allocation, escalation, learning myopia and so on 
(Bromiley, 2005). And yet, the editors of a recent special issue of this journal on the “psychological 
foundations of strategic management” observe that “strategic management theory lacks adequate 
psychological groundings” and they conclude that “until strategy theory builds stronger foundations 
in psychology, it will struggle to explain the facts of firm performance” (Powell, Lovallo & Fox, 
2011: 1370) (see also Greve, 2013). The key problem, they argue, is inadequate paradigm 
development in “behavioral strategy,” that is, the merger of cognitive and social psychology with 
strategic management theory and practice. Strikingly, however, motivational issues are not 
mentioned in their overview of “behavioral strategy.”  
 The behavioral approach to strategy has not gone uncontested. For example, Felin and Foss 
(2011) criticize its philosophical foundations, arguing that in spite of the stated interest in developing 
a more realistic view of decision-making, the behavioral approach fundamentally derives from 
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behaviorist psychology and works with the same impoverished view of decision-making. Our point 
of departure is different:  behavioral strategy is not sufficient, because it says too little about 
motivation. Specifically, behavioral theory focuses all attention on cognitive issues, such as 
perception, framing, experiential and vocational learning, and heuristics. However, a key theme in 
psychology research over the last two decades is that cognition and motivation are strongly 
intertwined, so strongly intertwined, in fact, that often they are not meaningfully separable 
(Kruglanski, 1999).  Behavioral strategy typically emphasizes search heuristics, attention, memory, 
etc. as drivers of management decisions and firm behavior. Behavioral strategy’s starting point in 
bounded rationality is entirely warranted. A fundamental characteristic of cognitive processes is 
indeed their selectivity: Attention is selective, memory is selective, concepts and chunks of 
knowledge are at any given moment only selectively accessible. Selectivity comes about by the twin 
process of activating some aspects and inhibiting others (cf. Shah, Friedman & Kruglanski, 2002). 
This creates important differences regarding how individuals look at a situation, the key point in 
behavioral strategy. However, the link of these cognitive effects with motivational effects is brought 
about by overarching goals. The dynamics of overarching goals combines cognitive and motivational 
processes in their relation to the environment, and thus the dynamics of these goals should be the 
core aspect of microfoundations for strategic management. Goal-framing theory specifies how these 
links come about.  
Goal-framing Theory 
A key finding of recent social psychological research is that individuals act very differently in 
terms of their strategy choice (defect or cooperate) depending cues in the environment. For example, 
the very same prisoners’ dilemma can carry the label “Community game” or “Wall Street game” and 
this cue makes a big difference for the strategy people choose (Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004; 
see also Pillutla & Chen, 1999). Experimental game theory has produced very similar findings (e.g., 
Camerer, 2003). A cogent explanation for such strong effects of cues is that they affect the relative 
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weight of activated overarching goals (see Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg 2008, Lindenberg 2012a), as 
specified in goal-framing theory (Lindenberg 2008, Lindenberg & Steg 2007). Goal-framing theory 
is all about the fact that a particular overarching goal can govern large sets of subgoals and thereby 
change what preferences are salient, which even affects the kind of constraints that are being 
perceived. Let us briefly have a closer look at how this works. 
Goal-framing theory distinguishes between three overarching goals. There is the overarching 
hedonic goal, which expresses the desire to improve (or preserve) the way one feels right now, 
related to one’s need fulfillment; there is the overarching gain goal, which expresses the desire to 
improve (or preserve) one’s resources; and there is the overarching normative goal which expresses 
the desire to act appropriately in the service of a collective entity, such as an organization or a group. 
When one of these three goals is focal, it captures so many of the cognitive and motivational 
processes that it truly “frames” the situation. Thus, these overarching goals govern what we attend to 
(Posner & Petersen, 1990), what alternatives we consider, and what knowledge we draw on (Förster 
et al., 2005; Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Kruglanski & Köpetz, 2009). In turn, these cognitive 
processes have an impact on motivation by inhibiting other goals (Shah et al., 2002), by influencing 
what we like and dislike (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004), and by governing the expectations about what 
other people will do and the criteria that are used to judge goal realization or failure (Carver & 
Scheier, 2002).  
Goals need to be activated (or “focal”), notably by situational cues, in order to influence 
behavior. A goal frame denotes an overarching goal (together with the integrated 
cognitive/motivational processes that are driven by this goal) when it is more strongly activated than 
the other two overarching goals. For example, organizational members who are in a gain goal-frame 
and whose specific goal within this frame is to improve their status in the organization, will be 
particularly alert to information about opportunities for improving status; the relevant causal 
knowledge they activate is what pertains to reaching this goal; they will be oriented towards the 
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longer term, and are likely to focus on behavioral alternatives that advance their status position to 
various degrees. Opportunities pertaining to other high-level goals (such as “behaving appropriately” 
in the service of joint production) are likely to be more or less ignored unless they overlap with 
opportunities for the status goal. A goal-frame does not completely inhibit the other two overarching 
goals. Rather, it pushes these other goals the background to various degrees. More often than not, 
motivations are therefore mixed and it depends on the relative strength of the foreground and 
background goals what the final effect will be. Cues in the environment will heavily influence the 
relative weight, thereby creating shifts in cognitions and motivations. However, due to a different 
apriori strength of the overarching goals, it takes stronger cues to increase the weight of a normative 
goal-frame than for the hedonic goal-frame (with the gain goal-frame in between). This makes 
evolutionary sense; thus, from an evolutionary point of view, the group is there for the adaptive 
advantage of the individual and not the other way around. Thus the goal-frame pertaining to a group 
orientation is apriori the weakest and thus highly precarious. The hedonic goal-frame pertaining to 
the satisfaction of needs here and now is apriori the strongest, and the goal-frame pertaining to 
resources is in between.
1
  
The important additional point for the microfoundations for strategic management is that the 
most potent cues in the environment that affect the relative strength of a goal-frame are the signals of 
goal-frames of other people, especially of those in higher positions (Aarts, Gollwitzer & Hassin, 
2004; Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg 2008, 2011). This creates a strong top-down contagious process of 
goal-frames (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011) that is enhanced by horizontal contagion because each 
employee’s goal-frame becomes a cue that affects the other’s goal-frame, creating a strong tendency 
for goal-frames to spread in a group. Because the normative goal-frame is highly precarious and 
because power-relations are highly asymmetric (i.e., top-down), employees watch out for signals that 
reveal the goal-frame of the management (Lindenberg 2000; Takeuchi, Chen & Lepak, 2009). If 
                                                          
1
 Note that this while goals can displace each other, they are not necessarily conflict. Different goals can be compatible 
although only one goal can be in the cognitive foreground. More on this in Lindenberg and Foss (2011). 
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higher-ups clearly signal that they are in a normative goal-frame, it will greatly help to stabilize this 
goal-frame in subordinates (Mühlau & Lindenberg, 2003; Brown, Treviño & Harrison 2005). By the 
same token, signals that higher-ups are not in a normative goal-frame will weaken this goal-frame in 
subordinates.  
GOAL-FRAMING, JOINT PRODUCTION MOTIVATION, AND VALUE-CREATION 
Joint Production Motivation 
Different goal-frames are associated with different levels of value creation in firms because 
different goal-frames are associated with mobilizing motivation for very different goals. In 
particular, we argue that the normative goal-frame is associated with the highest levels of value 
creation. The reason is that this goal-frame, and it alone, can prompt the motivation of organizational 
members to engage in truly collaborative activities, what Lindenberg and Foss (2011) call joint 
production motivation. Organizational members can recognize a joint endeavor and see themselves 
as part of this endeavor, each with their own roles and responsibilities, involving a sharing of 
cognitions about the relevant tasks, interdependencies, timing, and possible obstacles to smooth 
coordination. This leads them to exert intelligent and adaptive efforts that result in productivity gains 
and innovativeness. Why is joint production motivation so important? 
 In the strategy literature Lippman and Rumelt (2003) model firms as bundles of 
complementary, co-specialized resources. They argue that the “… heart of business management and 
strategy concerns the creation, evaluation, manipulation, administration, and deployment of unpriced 
specialized resource combinations” (2003: 1083; emph. in orig.). While choosing new resources and 
discovering novel ways of combining resources are important avenues to superior performance, it is 
a major point of our argument that at the heart of specialized resource combinations is the motivation 
of human resources in the bundle (Baron & Kreps, 1999; Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Lindenberg & 
Foss, 2011). Strategy thus has to focus first and foremost on this motivation for the realization of 
whatever higher strategic goal is chosen. We will argue that there is a special motivation that may 
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characterize interacting resources in a bundle and, that strategy should focus on activating and 
increasing this motivation in the service of achieving superior firm performance.  
 Another word for the resources bundles of Lippman and Rumelt is “teams” (Alchian, 1984). 
Teams are a basic form of human cooperation with an impressive evolutionary past, firms are indeed 
organized around teams of strongly complementary human resources (Lepak & Snell, 1999; 
Lippman & Rumelt, 2003), and several literatures in management and economics research are taken 
up with teams.
2
 However, none of these literatures explicitly recognize a key recent finding of 
evolutionary anthropology, namely that human beings are especially equipped with cognitive and 
motivational faculties that are specifically geared to team-based cooperation (i.e., motivation for joint 
production) and that this is special source of motivation that created the adaptive advantages of 
humans cooperating in groups. Joint production involves heterogeneous but complementary 
resources, a high degree of task and outcome interdependence, and the potential for super-additive 
outcomes (as in Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). According to what become known as the “social brain 
hypothesis,” the most potent human brain power (the neocortex) evolved as a “social brain” to allow 
human beings to realize the adaptive advantages that stem from cooperation in larger groups 
involving joint production (Dunbar, 2003). The brain apparently contains a hardwired ability to 
recognize a situation as one of joint production, and to trigger motivational and cognitive faculties 
that are specialized to facilitate joint production (cf. Sebanz, Bekkering & Knoblich, 2006).
3
   
                                                          
2
 The economics of the firm literature offers two very different understandings of the nature of teams. One derives from 
Alchian and Demsetz’ basic characterization of team production, that is, productive activity that involves heterogeneous 
but complementary resources, a high degree of task and outcome interdependence, and the potential for super-additive 
outcomes. The other derives from Marschak and Radner’s (1972) characterization of a team as a group of agents with a 
common goal that can only be achieved by an appropriate combination and coordination of the individual activities of the 
group members. Both contributions have given rise to much subsequent work. See Foss and Lindenberg (2012) for a 
more extensive discussion.  
3
 Of course, the social brain is also involved in deception and in detection of deception (Epley, Caruso & Bazerman, 
2006). Because of that, the normative goal-frame is important, not just the ability to put yourself into the shoes of others. 
In fact reactive egoism is most likely when an individual is already in a gain goal-frame. 
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 Haidt (2012: chpt. 10) adopts the imagery of a “hive switch,” which refers to the activation of a 
special (human) motivation that is specifically geared to the pursuit of team or group goals. 
However, the hive terminology is potentially misleading as it also implies an imagery of mindless, 
ant-like individuals. Indeed, empirical research shows that members of a team perceive the 
environment differently than in independent action, and generate shared representations of actions 
and tasks in terms of joint goals. They exert intelligent effort to cognitively coordinate temporal and 
spatial aspects of cooperation and to correctly anticipate goal-related actions from others (Sebanz et 
al., 2006). They are willing to induce and assist others to do their bit (Tomasello et al., 2005). In 
ambiguous situations, group members will not wait to be instructed but rather search actively for 
ways to serve the group goal(s) (De Dreu, Nijstad & Van Knippenberg, 2008), and they are heedful 
of their and others’ contribution to the collective goals (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Given the right 
social and cultural circumstances (Henrich et al., 2001), a special kind of motivation that contains all 
these ingredients is activated, namely “joint production motivation.” Because extant research on 
teams does not recognize joint production motivation it sidesteps “… some of the most interesting … 
questions about teams, including: What are the sources of the economic surpluses in team 
production, and how can they best be harnessed and directed?” (Blair & Stout, 1999: 267-8).  
Value Creation from a Goal-Framing Perspective 
 The consideration of joint production motivation changes the way one may look at value 
creation in firms. Strategic management is conventionally taken to be about the creation and 
appropriation of value, and specifically creating and appropriating more value than the competition 
(i.e., superior financial performance) on a sustained basis (Peteraf & Barney, 2003). While the 
yardstick for the financial performance is reasonably clear (e.g., average industry profitability), what 
is the yardstick against which we measure value creation? Strategy scholars who have addressed this 
question have typically taken an economics perspective and defined the maximum conceivable level 
of value creation as the relevant yardstick. Thus, Lippman and Rumelt (2003: 1082) in their focus on 
12 
 
coalitions of resources defined “strategic equilibrium as the state in which all possible resource 
transfers that create value have taken place.” Foss and Foss (2005) focus on how the reduction of 
transaction costs increase value creation, and argue that the relevant yardstick is a state of zero 
transaction costs, implying maximum value creation. Such states are what economists call “first-
best” states.  
 Note, however, that such efficiency yardsticks are defined relative to given preferences. In 
standard microeconomics, preferences stay put: people know exactly what they like, how much they 
like it relative to other things, and the relevant ranking does not change over time. (Or, if changes of 
preferences take place, they are not caused by economic factors). In the world of standard 
microeconomics, top-management changing strategic goals or exercising transformational leadership 
may have behavioral consequences at lower levels of the organization (e.g., because of the 
informational content of such a change, e.g., Hermalin, 1998), but these behavioral consequences are 
not (and cannot be) driven by preference changes of organizational members. Accordingly, leaders 
can only influence the actions chosen by organizational members, their work/leisure tradeoffs, their 
behavioral persistence, problem-solving intensity say, exercise of sophisticated helping behaviors, 
and so on, by changing their constraints. By implication,  the assumed stability of preferences 
represents a brake on value creation. It also represents a constraint on what can meaningfully be said 
about impact of strategic goals on the motivation of organizational members. The fundamental 
problem is that (given) preference is a part of a logic of trade-offs which tends to suppress or 
trivialize the processes that lead to preference orderings. In contrast, goal-framing theory builds off 
of a logic of means-ends relationships, where changing overarching goals imply changing entire sets 
of situationally salient preferences. Preferences and constraints thus interact.  
 In terms of goal-framing theory, standard microeconomics assumes that individuals are always 
and everywhere in the gain-goal frame. Thus, it is not just that preferences are stable but also that 
they have a specific content, that is, individuals (always and everywhere) seek to pursue their own 
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individual interests.
4
 That individuals entertain such interests is uncontroversial and economics has 
made impressive headway based on its single-minded examination of the many ramifications of 
individuals pursuing their own goals and intentions. Thus, agency theory and mechanism design 
theory have yielded much important insight into how harmonizing colletive and individual goals can 
be (partially) brought about by interest alignment through incentives and/or supervision. However, 
such alignment usually requires very significant monitoring effort (of input and/or output 
performance), and because of the costliness of monitoring, it is inherently imperfect, thus severely 
limiting the actual alignment of interests (Lindenberg 2013). By contrast, because of normative goal-
frames and joint production motivation, there is a different way to link the individual employee to 
organizational goals: individuals may also choose actions in terms of what serves collective goals. 
Standard microeconomics rules this out, because the team is only a context for the realization of the 
agent’s individual goals. The entire process of deliberating upon and choosing actions in terms of 
group goals is thus ignored as a source of value creation 
 In sum, the notion of first-best value creation imported from standard microeconomics assumes 
that organizational members are always in a gain goal-frame (Foss & Lindenberg, 2012). The 
introduction of the normative goal-frame and its support of joint production motivation change this: 
The first-best in a situation where organizational members are in a normative goal-frame is 
different—specifically, higher—relative to what it is when organizational members are in a gain 
goal-frame. Because of the difficulty of establishing and maintaining a normative goal-frame and 
joint production motivation, the additional economic surplus that is caused by the motivational force 
of a collective orientation accrues on the longer run. Interest alignment (with all its limitations) often 
seems a first-best solution when one takes a short-term perspective. In this perspective, not just the 
longer-term advantages of joint production motivation are neglected, but the costs of using interest 
                                                          
4
 To be sure, (behavioral) economics is by no means inconsistent with the notion that decisions can be driven by self-
esteem, excitement, fairness, etc. However, these are modelled as extra determinants of utility that  are not dependent on 
the context. In contrast, goal-framing theory points out that the salience of various goals, such as pursuing fairness, is 
context-dependent.  
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alignment are also ignored (Lindenberg 2013)  What, more specifically, are the sources of this 
additional economic surplus stemming from joint production motivation? 
 Joint production motivation has beneficial organization-level consequences that either directly 
or indirectly translates into higher value creation, because it impacts the tasks that organizational 
members are willing to engage in, how much effort they will put into these tasks, and how they 
coordinate their actions. Empirical research links the normative goal frame to pro-social behaviors, 
such as spontaneous sharing of knowledge (De Dreu et al., 2008), which, in turn, may positively 
impact work productivity and innovation performance (Tsai, 2001).  The heedful interrelating 
discussed by Weick and Roberts (1993), and found to assist coordination in ambiguous situations 
(Weick & Roberts, 1993) and to promote innovation performance (Dougherty & Takacs, 2004), 
results from joint production motivation. As the normative goal frame implies a partial suspension of 
moral hazard/opportunism, it reduces the need for costly control mechanisms (Podsakoff & 
McKenzie, 1997).  
 Coordination costs are reduced because joint production motivation implies that organizational 
members generate shared representations of actions and tasks in terms of joint goals, reducing the 
need for planning and formalization. Individual efforts are channeled towards the realization of 
common goals. Because individuals who are in a normative goal frame engage in fundamentally pro-
social activities that they do not engage in when in the gain goal frame (and may choose higher 
levels of effort), the first best under joint production motivation is higher than the first-best identified 
by standard microeconomics. Because standard microeconomics assumes that individuals are always 
in the gain goal frame, it is simply too pessimistic with respect to what can be achieved by human 
cooperation and at the same time too optimistic about what can be achieved by attempts to align 
individual and organizational goals by incentives.
5
 In general, economics-based strategic 
                                                          
5
 This is clearly seen by Alchian and Woodward (1988) who in a review of Williamson (1985) conclude that “… it is 
important to recognize the forces of ethics, etiquette, and ‘proper, correct, reasonable, moral, etc.’ standards of conduct in 
controlling business relationships.”  While they may have the language to describe what is seemingly so important, they 
admit that “…. we don't know enough about how such ‘moral’ forces operate to say more than that they exist and should 
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management therefore underestimates the upside of what firms can do in terms of value creation, 
because it neglects the normative goal-frame and joint production motivation.   
This underestimation of cooperative potential is confounded by a systematic neglect of the 
costs of failures to achieve interest alignment by incentives (in terms of indicator behavior, apathy, 
and sabotage, see Lindenberg, 2013).  This neglect derives to a large extent from the fact that 
microeconomics has no room for the workings of the hedonic goal-frame. Hedonic goals are directed 
at improving how one feels at a particular moment, such as seeking direct improvement in self-
esteem, seeking excitement, and avoiding unpleasant effort, and reacting to perceived unfairness 
(such as sabotage and taking revenge). The criteria for success in a hedonic goal-frame relate to 
improvements in the way one feels not the way things function. The power of this goal-frame vis-à-
vis rival goal-frames is considerable and it derives from its direct link to basic needs and emotions 
(Ryan, Huta & Deci, 2008).  
An organization in which members take a myopic perspective and are predominantly 
hedonically oriented is not conducive to value creation (cf. Lindenberg, 2004): Investments in human 
capital are not undertaken, helping behaviors do not thrive, and rewards that are not directly linked to 
efforts may be useless. Such myopic behaviors may arise even if incentives are geared to supporting 
a gain goal frame. For example, Postrel and Rumelt (1992) document cases in which, even in spite of 
high-powered incentives, firms had to resort to intense monitoring to hinder the consequences of 
employees adopting hedonic goal frames.  For these reasons, the hedonic goal frame is the goal 
frame that is associated with the lowest level of value creation.  
Figure 1 depicts how goal frames and value creation are related (for the two kinds of human 
resources, x1 and x2, interacting in a team, but generalizable to n human resources). The key 
questions raised by the figure are how firms can reach the level of value creation associated with the 
goal frame, and, once reached, how firms can maintain this level of value creation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
not be ignored in seeking an understanding of how the economic institutions of capitalism, or any other -ism, evolve and 
operate ... Whatever the emotive language, ‘decent’ behavior saves resources and enables greater welfare“ (Alchian & 
Woodward, 1988: 77). 
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---- Insert Figure 1 here ---- 
STRATEGIC CONCERNS: LINKING JOINT PRODUCTION MOTIVATION, 
GOVERNANCE, AND STRATEGIC GOALS 
There are potentially two interrelated avenues by which strategic management can affect the 
motivation for joint production and thereby bring about the consequences of such motivation in 
terms of high levels of appropriable value creation. One is the direct way: By making the internal 
governance structure for joint production motivation a core concern for strategy. The other way is 
indirect: adopting an oblique approach to strategic opportunities (Kay, 2010; Birkinshaw, 2012), that 
is, to opportunities that increase appropriable value creation (Denrell, Fang & Winter, 2003).  
However, there are supporting relations between these two approaches: A governance structure that 
supports joint production motivation is positively or negatively affected by strategic goals of the 
firm. Only oblique (and typically prosocial) strategic goals will support a governance structure for 
joint production motivation. Moreover, we argue, both ways are importantly interrelated with 
leadership style, which gives leadership style a central place in strategy; see Figure 2. In the 
remainder of the article, we will unfold the logic that generated Figure 2.  
---- Insert Figure 2 Here ---- 
 The Internal Governance Structure as Strategic Concern 
As stated, goal-frames have a strong tendency to spread in a group. The more employees see 
others committed to joint production, the stronger their own commitment. For example, to the degree 
to which others have positive feelings about their jobs, employees are more willing to use intelligent 
effort in terms of innovativeness (Shipton, West, Parkes, Dawson & Patterson, 2006). Similarly, 
receiving positive relational signals from others in the daily interaction on the shop floor fosters 
sending positive relational signals and increases overall performance (Colquitt, 2004; Tabibnia, 
Satpute & Lieberman, 2008)).  Conversely, colleagues who clearly show that they work for their own 
goals (gain or hedonic) rather than for company goals, can drag many others to their side.  
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Colleagues have a weaker contagion effect than higher-ups.  As already mentioned, the 
normative goal-frame is highly precarious and power-relations are highly asymmetric (i.e., top-
down), and because of this, employees watch out for signals that reveal the goal-frame of the 
management (Mühlau & Lindenberg, 2003; Takeuchi, Chen & Lepak, 2009). If higher-ups clearly 
signal that they are in a normative goal-frame, it will greatly help to stabilize this goal-frame in 
subordinates (Mühlau & Lindenberg, 2003; Brown, Treviño & Harrison 2005). By the same token, 
signals that higher-ups are not in a normative goal-frame will weaken this goal-frame in 
subordinates. For example, in a vignette study, Keizer, Lindenberg and Steg (2013) show that when 
higher-ups use company money for their private purposes, employees are less inclined to keep to 
their own work rules. In short, such “goal contagion” effect (Aarts, Gollwitzer & Hassin, 2004) can 
strongly influence the stability of the normative goal-frame in both positive and negative directions. 
This also limits the ability by the management to use the language of cooperation, joint production, 
and solidarity as a means to get individuals to work for the company goals, without believably 
signaling that they are in a normative goal-frame. Signaling such a normative goal-frame is 
inherently difficult. Because of the difference in power and in stakes with regard to company profits, 
employees don’t easily trust higher-ups, which makes relational signals from the top very costly and 
easily distorted. Therefore, management signaling of a normative goal frame needs support from 
other structures (cf. also Foss, Reinholdt, Pedersen & Stea, 2013).  
In previous work (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011), we have identified the organizational 
preconditions for the activation of a normative goal-frame that is conducive to joint production 
motivation. For reasons of space, we only briefly summarize these preconditions. First, members of 
an organization must perceive their various interdependencies in terms of joint production (through 
the team and task structure). Thus, employees must understand that tasks and teams are designed for 
the achievement and maintenance of joint production. The clearer the common goals, the various 
roles in which individuals help to reach these goals, and the functional connections of tasks and goals 
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between different levels of the firm, the easier it is for employees to develop and sustain a motivation 
for joint production. Second, even if common goals are specified in the task and team design, they 
must still be embedded in a shared sense of common direction and affect on the level of the firm. 
This will also help prevent subunit egoism. A suitable means for achieving a common direction is a 
vision and mission statement, consensually supported by top management, that focuses on a common 
purpose (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001) rather than operational goals that are appropriate for the task 
and team structure. Third, reward structures must be calibrated so that they provide direct support for 
the normative goal-frame (i.e., individual rewards should be explicitly recognitions for contributions 
to joint production, and team rewards for contributions to high-level goals). This also holds for 
indirect support by keeping the gain goal frame in the background strong enough to stall excessive 
group pressure and conformism. In addition to non-contingent rewards linked to position, employees 
also need to be rewarded individually in a contingent manner in order to maintain the motivation to 
engage in certain activities. But contingent gain rewards, such as status advancement and money, 
must remain modest, because they can foster a gain goal-frame, just as contingent hedonic rewards, 
such as especially enjoyable tasks and better offices, can foster a hedonic goal-frame. When rewards 
get too strong, they can undermine the normative goal-frame, and intelligent effort will be selectively 
driven by what leads to personal rewards (hedonic or gain), rather than by contribution to the 
realization of common goals. Fourth, authority should be legitimized in terms of the functional 
prerequisites for joint production, by linking it to superior insight on what is needed for the 
realization of common goals, rather than based on fiat and contractual clauses. 
Gain-related Strategic Goals and the Importance of Obliquity  
Goal-framing theory explicitly addresses high-level (strategic) goals. But true to the 
importance of motivation for joint production, it focuses on the implications of such high-level goals 
for motivation. The key to understanding how this works is the vertical contagion effect. Thus, if 
firms adopt goals that stress seeking to continually seize profit opportunities (as in Avon Products’ 
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“We will deliver superior returns to our shareholders by tirelessly pursuing new growth 
opportunities”), this sends a signal down in the organization that top-management is in a gain goal-
frame. Due to the contagion effect of overarching goals, this means that the gain goal-fame will 
spread throughout the organization. Thus, if gains are explicitly addressed as the key strategic goal, 
this makes it difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a governance structure that supports joint 
production motivation.  For this reason, goal-framing theory would maintain that even though firms 
have to make profits, gain-related strategic goals should not get center stage (Lindenberg 2013). 
They should be approached obliquely. This point has also been picked up recently by popular 
management books that have made the case for “oblique” strategic goals (explicitly in Kay, 2010; 
Birkinshaw, 2012). There, the arguments for this oblique approach remain somewhat fuzzy. As 
Birkinshaw (2012: 124) notes, obliquity is “not an easy concept to come to grips with,” and it is not 
well established in the research literature in strategic management (in fact, there has, as far as we can 
tell, been no attention to the concept or the underlying ideas in the research literature).   
There are scholars who have examined the impact of strategic goals on the internal workings of 
the firm. They provide part of the answer by emphasizing that organizational goals serve the 
functions of providing direction, facilitating planning, and assisting in the process of evaluating and 
controlling performance (Barney & Griffin, 1992). The potential motivating role of strategic goals 
frequently emerges in such discussions.
6
  For example, Hamel and Prahalad’s (1989: 64) discussion 
of strategic intent links this construct to an “…active management process that include focusing the 
organization’s attention on the essence of winning, motivating people by communicating the value of 
the target, leaving room for individual and team contributions [and] sustaining enthusiasm by 
providing new operational definitions as circumstances change.” But lacking microfoundations that 
deal with the integration of cognition and motivation through overarching goals, the possibility and 
importance of obliquity has not been theorized. Goal-framing theory can give a clear underpinning of 
                                                          
6
 There is also work on the motivational ramifications of employee involvement in strategic planning (e.g., Ketokivi & 
Castaner, 2004), but this is distinct from our focus here on the motivational implications of strategic goals (i.e., outcomes 
of planning processes). 
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the importance of obliquity with regard to gain goals and, as we will see shortly, some of the world’s 
best known corporations seem to have arrived at the same point. Let us look at this link between 
strategy and obliquity in somewhat more detail. 
Strategic goals exist at different levels, from mission and vision statements at the highest 
strategic level over operational goals at the business unit level to the goals set for individual 
organizational members. In this discussion, we focus on the high-level, strategic goals that define 
aspirations and directions for the firm as a whole, but the arguments are meant to apply equally to 
strategic goals nested in lower levels. High-level strategic goals of the organization are the 
embedding for lower-level strategic goals and thus influence the weight of goal-frames inside the 
firm, thereby indirectly affecting the motivation for joint production. Such goals have a double 
function. One function is the direct influence in the relative strength of the gain goal over the 
normative goal. This influence derives from the fact that overarching goals are highly contagious, 
especially when they are imbued with status. Because the normative goal-frame is apriori weaker 
than the gain goal-frame, the former will be easily displaced by the latter. In this way high-level 
goals will have a trickle effect through all levels of the organization, if it is known that the 
management (“status”) stands behind these goals.  
 But high-level strategic goals also have another important function: they help or hinder 
coordinated action and the use and sharing of knowledge, depending on how they affect the 
employees’ understanding of higher-level goals. For example, increasing market share as a strategic 
goal pushes a gain goal-frame. That alone makes it difficult to maintain a normative goal-frame for 
joint production motivation. But such a goal also makes it difficult for employees to know how their 
tasks relate to those of others, not giving them a sense of why and how they matter (see Anand et al, 
2008; Montgomery 2008). This too, frustrates the realization and maintenance of joint production 
motivation.   
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High-level strategic goals either refer directly to gain (profit or market share, or shareholder 
value etc.) or they refer to a substantive mission in terms of societal goals. In both versions, these 
goals that define the aspiration of firms, are quite abstract and not very operational. But they are 
directional, providing purpose, and that is their strategic function. “Sitting at the hub of the strategy 
wheel, purpose aligns all the functional pieces and draws the company into a logically consistent 
whole. Well understood, it serves as both a constraint on activity and a guide to behavior.” 
(Montgomery 2008: 56). For example, compare the mission statement by the Cooper Tire & Rubber 
Company with that of IKEA. “The purpose of the Cooper Tire & Rubber Company is to earn money 
for its shareholders and increase the value of their investment. We will do that through growing the 
company, controlling assets and properly structuring the balance sheet, thereby increasing EPS, cash 
flow, and return on invested capital.” This mission is clearly directed at gain and it will push a gain 
goal-frame in the employees. In addition, it does not help employees to define their own role, to 
understand their purpose in the organization. This contrasts with IKEA’s mission statement, namely 
to  “… offer a wide range of home furnishing items of good design and function, excellent quality 
and durability, at prices so low that the majority of people can afford to buy them”. This mission 
statement can serve collective identification with firm goals (thus supporting a normative goal-
frame) and it helps the individual employee to give direction to his or her own role in realizing the 
collective goals. Other examples are not difficult to find. For example, another Fortune 500 
company, Avon Products, declares that “We will deliver superior returns to our shareholders by 
tirelessly pursuing new growth opportunities while continually improving our profitability, a socially 
responsible, ethical company that is watched and emulated as a model of success.” Here, an ethical 
component is mentioned, but it is hijacked by the gain component. By contrast, LEGO’s mission is 
stated as ”to help children develop their creativity and learning skills through constructive play.”  
This goal is both easy to identify with (thus supporting a collective orientation to the firm’s goal) and 
concrete enough to give each employee a sense of what it is that needs to be done (Lindenberg & 
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Foss 2011). High-level strategic goals can also be explicitly linked to goals of the employees. For 
example, the pharmaceutical company Eisai explicitly states that “it is most important that we know 
and share the feelings of the patients, their joys, anger, sadness, and happiness. The essence of Eisai 
is our pursuit of the “’Eisai way,’ which is realized through the exercise of strong entrepreneurship 
by each employee” (in Spender & Strong, 2012: 18). 
The Strategic Importance of Leadership Style 
 For both ways to influence the motivation for joint production (governance structure and 
obliquity with regard to gain-goals), there is likely to be a symbiotic relationship with leadership 
style, which imbues leadership style with strategic importance. First of all, there is the top-down 
contagion process that gives considerable weight to the overarching goals of leaders for affecting the 
goal-frames of the employees. Thus for obliquity to work, the leadership must be seen as supporting 
these high-level goals also in daily practice. Second of all, leadership can actively encourage 
identification with the organization and the preconditions for individuals to be motivated to take 
individual responsibility for reaching collective goals. In the literature, such kind of leadership has 
been identified as transformational leadership (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996; Judge & Piccolo, 2004; 
Grant, 2012).  
 Overall, this literature asserts that (strategic) leaders motivate followers/employees by 
communicating compelling visions, typically in the context of stressing collective identities as we all 
as generally and strongly held core human values that can motivate followers to switch from gain 
goal frames to normative goal frames (Shamir, House & Arthur, 1993). Thus, from the point of view 
of goal-framing theory, transformational leaders need to capture motivating aspects of the high-level 
goals and use them to steer identification processes so that they provide direct support for the 
normative goal-frame by embedding common goals (Van Knippenberg, 2000) and providing links to 
values (Thompson & Bunderson, 2003). Because the normative goal-frame is linked to a supra-
individual entity, there must be particular emphasis on what organizational members have in 
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common, what binds them, together with the creation and maintenance of positive affect connected 
to what organizational members have in common (Bollen & Hoyle, 1990; Liberman et al., 2004; 
Zaccaro & McCoy, 1988).  
Grant (2012: 458) notes that findings in the transformational leadership literature have been 
mixed, with “inconsistent effects of transformational leadership on followers’ performance” 
emerging in laboratory as well as field experiments. A possible reason is that leaders may fail to take 
steps “to ensure that the vision is not simply rhetoric” (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996: 37). Indeed, goal-
framing theory suggests that strategic “as if” relational campaigns that actually only try to create the 
appearance of relational concern and concern for individual improvement, will not be effective for 
long and will ultimately drive out normative goal-frames in favor of gain or hedonic goal-frames 
(Greenberg, 1990, Miller, 2001).  Of course, leaders also have a transactional role of control, but that 
should be embedded in the transformational approach (Wang et al 2011). This means that control too 
needs to be approached obliquely. 
Grant (2012) suggests that transformational leadership is most effective with respect to 
motivating followers when leaders lead by example and engage in direct contact with followers. 
Goal-framing theory supports this idea: Because the normative goal-frame is highly precarious and 
because power-relations are highly asymmetric (i.e., top-down), employees watch out for signals that 
reveal the goal-frame of the management (Mühlau & Lindenberg, 2003; Six and Sorge 2008; 
Takeuchi, Chen & Lepak, 2009). What Grant calls “beneficiary contact,” for example, when leaders 
visibly work with organizational members (“beneficiaries”) in a manner oriented towards joint 
production, can signal the normative goal frame of leaders and show concretely to organizational 
members that strategic goals are indeed geared towards joint production and underpinned by 
prosocial visions that make a difference to stakeholders. Because of the contagion effects on the 
stability of the normative goal-frame, seeing that strategic leaders, in special communal events, show 
affective and consensual commitment to a cause and the related vision/mission, and seeing that many 
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other employees experience this simultaneously, creates affective communality among 
organizational members (see Islam & Zyphur, 2009; Trice & Beyer, 1984). In short,  there is need for 
a transactional role of control but it is of strategic importance that the leadership actually “live” their 
strategic goals that keep gain goals oblique. 
CONCLUSION 
From the point of view of pragmatic management research, microfoundations matter, not so much 
because microfoundations are philosophically the right thing to do, but because they furnish 
substantive implications for theory-building that truly matter to practitioners. This insight is not new, 
but until now, microfoundations for strategic management have separated the cognitive and 
motivational dimensions and neglected their crucial interconnection in the dynamics of overarching 
goals. To be sure, the investigation of the effects of heuristics and biases on the behavior of top-
management teams (Powell et al., 2011) is a worthwhile endeavor, as is the integration of motivation 
research with strategic management (Coff, 1997; Osterloh & Frey, 2000). However, consistent with 
important recent research in experimental economics, social psychology, and cognitive science, goal-
framing theory argues that cognitive and motivational microfoundations are strongly intertwined, and 
that both dimensions should be taken into account—and that this makes a substantive difference in 
terms of theory-development in strategic management. Specifically, goal-framing theory allows us to 
cast the fundamental strategic management issues of value creation and strategic goals in a new light 
and to explore their interrelations (cf. Figure 1 and 2).   
On the basis of goal-faming theory one can thus argue that the heart of value creation in firms 
lies in the motivation for joint production for all involved. No matter what the firm wants to achieve, 
optimal value creation will always crucially depend on eliciting a motivation among employees that 
is directed at common goals, such that organizational members are motivated to choose their actions 
in terms of joint goals and exert intelligent effort to reach joint goals (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011).  
Literatures on human resource management (e.g., Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni, 1994) and goal-
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setting (e.g., Locke & Latham, 2002) often address the strategic importance of employee motivation, 
but they do not focus on joint production motivation but rather on the dyadic link of the individual to 
the organization. For example, Rousseau and Wade-Benzoni (1994) argue that HR practices are key 
ways in which strategies are implemented. Different practices implement different psychological 
contracts and the motivation of an employee is closely related to her interpretation of promises and 
commitments issued by the organization. However, this literature remains fundamentally dyadic in 
its orientation: It is the relation between the individual organizational member and the organization 
that is in focus.  
In traditional microeconomic approaches to strategy, the joint production motivation has also 
been neglected, as have the costs of failing interest alignment with incentives.  Yet, from a strategic 
management point of view, it is exactly the motivation for joint production that is crucial for optimal 
value creation. Accordingly, we have argued that the core strategic concern is to create a governance 
structure that can bring about and maintain a high level of joint production motivation among all 
members of the organization. One way to do this is to make the governance structure itself a key 
strategic concern (for more detail, see Lindenberg and Foss, 2011).  
For the strategy field, another influence on the motivation for joint production is possibly less 
obvious but just as important: the influence of high-level strategic goals on motivation. Because of 
their obvious centrality, high-level strategic goals have been extensively discussed from multiple 
perspectives. For example, agency theorists have discussed the extent to which the goals of the firm 
are aligned with those of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976); resource-based theorists see the 
goals of the firm as constrained by the resource portfolio of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984); positioning 
theory explains how goals are constrained by external competitive forces (Porter, 1980); competitive 
dynamics theory emphasizes how environmental changes influence changes in strategic goals 
(Audia, Locke and Smith, 2000); strategy process theories explain how goals may emerge from 
lower echelons in the organization (Burgelman, 1994) or reflect changing levels of aspiration 
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(Shinkle, 2012) or reference points (Fiegenbaum, Hart & Schendel 1996, 222); and strategic 
leadership theorists examine how goals are influenced by the discretion possessed by strategic 
managers (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). However, whether, how and why strategic goals have to 
deal with obliquity is generally not addressed in the strategic management literature.  
As become clear from the point of view of goal-framing theory, with regard to high-level 
strategic goals, strategic management involves a fundamental squaring-of-the-circle operation: On 
the one hand the overall aim is indeed to maximize appropriable value creation relative to the 
competition. This seems to require a competitive and economizing mindset associated with the gain 
goal-frame. On the other hand, promoting such a mindset internally results (via the operation of the 
vertical goal contagion mechanism) in the adoption on the part of organizational members of the gain 
goal-frame, which is associated with a lower level of value creation than the normative goal-frame. 
The implication is that the successful maximization of net returns require an oblique strategy, that is, 
one that stresses explicit goals that can support the normative goal-frame, which—in turn—is 
conducive to joint production motivation and aids a governance structure that is supportive of joint 
product motivation.  
A good example of a successful oblique approach is the Swedish bank, Svenska 
Handelsbanken. Kroner (2011) who has studied this bank shows that the bank’s strategic goal of 
higher return on equity than the average of its peers is pursued in a rather oblique way (p.139-141) 
and supported by an internal organization that is conducive to joint production. Thus, 
Handelsbanken’s culture stresses employees being “self-directed and entrepreneurial” (p.93) with a 
high degree of accountability; the task structure is simple and highly transparent (p.96); and 
“Handelsbanken does not award bonuses” (p.98). This internal organization supports the “… bank’s 
visceral dislike for risk-taking, its focus on concentrating on customer satisfaction over profits, and 
its emphasis on long-term orientation” (p.99). Svenska Handelsbanken has been consistently 
successful in pursuing its strategic goal in this oblique way, placing it among the top-25 in Europe.  
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This success of Handelsbanken is a witness to yet another strategic concern derivable from 
goal-framing theory: the importance of transformational leadership. Such leadership is important in 
making strategic gain goals oblique, in creating common purpose, and in maintaining a governance 
structure that is supportive of joint production motivation. The three strategic concerns suggested 
here (governance, oblique gain goals, and transformational leadership) take time and a long-term 
perspective to develop and might well constitute the heart of the complex and path-dependent 
resources highlighted by the resource-based perspective (Barney, 1991).  
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Figure 2: The key concerns for strategic management based 
on goal-framing theory
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